Intrinsic mitigation of the after-gate attack in quantum key
  distribution through fast-gated delayed detection by Koehler-Sidki, Alex et al.
Intrinsic mitigation of the after-gate attack in quantum key distribution through
fast-gated delayed detection
A. Koehler-Sidki,1, 2 J. F. Dynes,1, ∗ A. Martinez,1 M. Lucamarini,1
G. L. Roberts,1, 2 A. W. Sharpe,1 Z. L. Yuan,1 and A. J. Shields1
1Toshiba Research Europe Ltd, Cambridge Research Laboratory,
208 Cambridge Science Park, Milton Road, Cambridge, CB4 0GZ, United Kingdom
2Engineering Department, University of Cambridge,
9 J. J. Thomson Avenue, Cambridge CB3 0FA, United Kingdom
(Dated: August 29, 2019)
The information theoretic security promised by quantum key distribution (QKD) holds as long as
the assumptions in the theoretical model match the parameters in the physical implementation. The
superlinear behaviour of sensitive single-photon detectors represents one such mismatch and can pave
the way to powerful attacks hindering the security of QKD systems, a prominent example being the
after-gate attack. A longstanding tenet is that trapped carriers causing delayed detection can help
mitigate this attack, but despite intensive scrutiny, it remains largely unproven. Here we approach
this problem from a physical perspective and find new evidence to support a detector’s secure
response. We experimentally investigate two different carrier trapping mechanisms causing delayed
detection in fast-gated semiconductor avalanche photodiodes, one arising from the multiplication
layer, the other from the heterojunction interface between absorption and charge layers. The release
of trapped carriers increases the quantum bit error rate measured under the after-gate attack above
the typical QKD security threshold, thus favouring the detector’s inherent security. This represents
a significant step to avert quantum hacking of QKD systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises secure distri-
bution of cryptographic digital keys [1], spurring signif-
icant development of the technology. This has rapidly
matured and is now stepping out of the laboratory and
into deployment in optical fibre networks [2–8]. Con-
tributing to its maturity, a great deal of research has
been devoted to quantum hacking [9–13], which identi-
fies imperfections of QKD components from their theo-
retical models and evaluate their implications for QKD
security. Best-practice criteria and countermeasures can
then be developed [14–21] to reinforce the identified weak
components and reclaim implementation security.
Due to their exposure to the quantum channel, single
photon detectors in QKD systems have been subjected to
most hacking attacks in the past decade [22–24]. Weak
detectors have been demonstrated to be under full control
of an eavesdropper (Eve), resulting in a collapse of secu-
rity [25]. Detector loopholes can be completely closed
by novel protocols that achieve measurement-device in-
dependent security [26–28]. However, these protocols re-
quire an intermediate relay and therefore their deploy-
ment in the network is unfavorably complex when com-
pared with standard point-to-point QKD links. A solu-
tion to regain detector security is thus highly desirable
for relayless QKD links.
Single photon detectors based on semiconductor In-
GaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs) serve the majority
of links in existing QKD networks [2–7], because they
operate at temperatures that are easily within reach of
thermo-electric cooling [29] or even room temperature
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[30]. The state-of-the-art systems can offer a key rate
exceeding 10 Mb/s [31] and operate over 200 km fiber
[32].
Attacks on InGaAs APDs have revealed their vulnera-
bilities, most of which have been dealt with because Eve’s
attack either changes the detector characteristics or pro-
duces a detectable fingerprint. However, as a special class
of faked state attack [9], the faint after-gate attack [33]
remains an open threat. This is because detectors under
such attack will maintain their single-photon sensitivity
and will not produce a massive photocurrent [34] as in
bright illumination attacks.
When a photon is absorbed by an InGaAs APD it gen-
erates an electron-hole pair. The hole can then become
trapped in defects or at barriers and is released with a
certain probability related to the characteristic time con-
stant of the trap. As opposed to trapped carriers arising
from macroscopic avalanches, whose lifetimes are on the
order of microseconds, the trapped hole lifetime at the
material interface is on the sub-nanosecond order. Such
trapping, therefore, does not have an effect in MHz-gated
detectors [33, 34]. However, under GHz gating, the trap-
ping time becomes comparable with the the detector gat-
ing period and the release of such carriers in subsequent
gates can result in substantial amounts of delayed de-
tection events. This could provide a means to mitigate
the faint after-gate attack. Hence, it is natural to look
at fast GHz-gated APDs [29] as a potential countermea-
sure to this attack. So far, however, there is no study
supporting this conjecture. Earlier investigations have
largely been concerned with MHz-gated detectors, where
the time between gates is significantly larger than the de-
cay time of trapped carriers. Furthermore, the analysis
of the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) has previously
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2focused solely on Eve’s target gate [33, 34], due to the
contribution from delayed detection events being negligi-
ble.
In this work, we investigate two sources of carrier trap-
ping in fast-gated InGaAs APDs, one from the multi-
plication layer and the other from the hetero-interface
between the two materials, and find that both cause a
non-negligible delayed detection probability.
This previously perceived drawback of single photon
InGaAs APDs can be used to detect an after-gate attack.
The delayed photodetection introduces an increase in the
QBER of the QKD system that unveils the attack, thus
promoting fast-gated devices as a means of mitigating
this potential vulnerability. In addition to that, we show
that the amount of induced QBER in Eve’s absence is
not excessive and still allows for efficient QKD operation
if the appropriate gating frequency is chosen.
To give some notion about the trapping mechanism, we
provide a schematic of a typical InGaAs avalanche pho-
todiode in Fig. 1(a). An incoming photon is absorbed in
the intrinsic InGaAs region where an electron-hole pair is
generated and subsequently separated by the electric field
in this region. The hole needs to overcome the potential
barrier that arises from the valence-band mismatch [35]
(the shaded purple area in Fig. 1(a)) to reach the InP
multiplication region so as to have a finite probability of
initiating a macroscopic avalanche which can be electron-
ically registered. During the generation of a macroscopic
avalanche, some of the avalanche carriers may become
trapped and can subsequently be released at a later time
causing a secondary avalanche, known as an ‘afterpulse’.
The release time scale is on the order of several microsec-
onds or greater [36–38].
We stress that the term ‘afterpulse’ or ‘afterpulsing’
only refers to clicks that are correlated with a previous
detection event. The notion of ‘delayed detection’, on
the other hand, is more general and it encompasses af-
terpulsing. It refers to all detection events originating
from trapped carriers, even those that did not give rise
to a detected avalanche in a previous gate.
The ability of the hole to overcome the valence-band
discontinuity, which is a potential barrier, directly af-
fects device characteristics such as detection efficiency
and timing response [39]. However, it is reasonable to
conclude that the hole trap time is significantly shorter
than 1 ns because sub-nanosecond gated-APDs still show
detection efficiencies as high as 55% [29]. If the decay
time were longer than 1 ns, than fewer than half of the
generated carriers would overcome the barrier and the de-
tection efficiency would not be able to exceed 50%. We
can infer from this analysis that the hole trap lifetime is
at least 3 orders of magnitude shorter than that of deep
traps causing afterpulses and we specially devised an ex-
periment to study it, which is schematically illustrated in
Fig. 1(b). Here, we optically excite an APD at the start of
a gate. When a hole fails to overcome the potential bar-
rier within Gate 1, it will have a finite probability to over-
come the barrier and initiate a macroscopic avalanche in
subsequent gates within several nanoseconds.
For this study we operate the InGaAs APDs in gated
Geiger mode at a clock frequency of 1 GHz. The
avalanche signals are discriminated with help of self-
differencing circuits that remove the capacitive response
to the applied gate [40]. A telecom C-band passively
mode-locked laser synchronized to the APD gating fre-
quency and with repetition frequency of 20 MHz and
pulse width of 3 ps is used to illuminate the APD via
its single mode fibre pigtail. We follow the best practice
criteria [20] to set the discrimination level of the self-
differencing APD. Time-tagging electronics with a dead
time of 50 ns are used to record the photon detection
histogram [29]. We have measured several InGaAs APDs
with different active diameters: 50µm and 16µm. In this
paper we present results from two 16µm devices, namely
APD1 and APD2. The 50µm devices showed similar be-
havior. Unless otherwise stated, the data presented is
from APD 1.
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FIG. 1. (a) Typical band diagram of separate absorption,
charge and multiplication structure of an InGaAs/InP APD,
where Eg is the band gap offset and EA is the effective bar-
rier height arising at the interface between the APD absorp-
tion and charge regions. (b) Illustration of gating scheme.
Electron-hole pairs are generated at the start of Gate 1 when
the laser is timed to arrival and experience an exponential de-
cay between the two gates. The proportion of holes leftover
at Gate 2 is related to the decay constant which is in turn
related to the activation energy given by the barrier height,
EA.
We first examine the role of the interface on the APD.
The APD is characterised as having a single photon de-
tection efficiency of 28% and an afterpulsing probability
of 4% at room temperature. Here, the optical flux is
3maintained at µ = 0.1 photons/pulse and the laser delay
is set to enable the photon arrival at the beginning of
the illuminated gate (schematically shown in Fig. 1(b)),
thus allowing an avalanche to have sufficient time to grow
above the discrimination level and hence have a maxi-
mum detection efficiency. Figure 2(a) shows a typical
photon detection histogram under such illumination con-
ditions. The illuminated gate gives a pronounced peak
arising from single photon detections. Immediately after
this peak, the count rate experiences a fast decay be-
fore reaching an approximately flat background at the
fifth gate. The flat background is attributed to detector
dark and afterpulsing counts. The elevated count rates
between 2 and 4 ns (Gates 2-4) cannot be attributed
to detector afterpulsing because the time-tagger has a
dead time of 50 ns. Moreover, the sub-nanosecond decay
time is orders of magnitude faster than typical lifetimes
of deep traps that are responsible for afterpulsing. We
attribute the elevated count rates at these gates to de-
layed photon detection caused by hole trapping at the
absorption/charge interface.
The above conclusion is supported by temperature de-
pendent measurements. It is possible to extract the inter-
face trapping lifetime by comparing counts in Gates 1 and
3 in the histogram data (Gate 2 is neglected due to the
possibility of cancellation from the self-differencer). Plot-
ting these lifetimes at different temperatures in an Arrhe-
nius configuration, where the excess bias as a proportion
of the breakdown voltage is kept constant for each tem-
perature, allows for the extraction of the effective bar-
rier height, EA at the material interface [35], shown in
Fig. 2(b), where the gradient is equal to EA/(kBT ). We
note that the values of activation energies; tens of meV
corresponding to lifetimes of several hundreds of picosec-
onds, and the trend of higher excess biases resulting in
overall shorter lifetimes, and consequently lower activa-
tion energies, are consistent with the literature [35, 41].
This implies that carriers with decays of several hundred
picoseconds are dominated by trapping at the heteroin-
terface when the APD is illuminated with fluxes of the
order of single photons.
Carriers with the decays of several hundred picosec-
onds could be used to mitigate the faint after-gate attack.
This is because Eve’s attempt to mount such an attack
using moderately high fluxes would result in delayed de-
tection events that would alert the users to her presence.
The sub-nanosecond separation between gates in GHz-
clocked APDs is sufficiently narrow to allow delayed de-
tection as a result of carriers with a decay on the order of
several hundred picoseconds to be observed where they
would be missed in slower, MHz-clocked systems [33, 34].
However, we find that in this regime, traps at the mul-
tiplication region become the dominant contribution to
delayed detection events, which we now examine.
In more detail, the after-gate attack is a class of faked
state attack which itself is a type of intercept-and-resend
attack [9]. Eve measures the photons sent by the trans-
mitter, Alice, with a copy of Bob’s apparatus. She then
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FIG. 2. (a) Time-resolved histogram of detected counts of the
APD under illumination of a pulsed laser with flux µ = 0.1,
clearly demonstrating an exponential decay in counts after the
initial illuminated gate; (b) An Arrhenius plot showing the
single photon detection efficiency as a function of the inverse
of the temperature, whereby the respective gradients allow
for the extraction of the hole activation energy.
sends her own pulses to Bob which are only detected if he
chooses the same measurement basis as Eve, else he reg-
isters nothing. In this way, after Alice and Bob exchange
basis information, Eve has a string that is perfectly cor-
related with that held by Alice and Bob. The aim for
Eve is thus to send a pulse which at full power regis-
ters a click with detection probability of 1 and at half
power (corresponding to incompatible bases), registers a
click with probability 0. More generally, when the prob-
ability at full power exceeds twice that of half power in
this manner, the detector behaviour is said to be ‘super-
linear’. If Eve sends attack pulses towards the end of
Bob’s APD gate, she can maximise the ratio of detection
probabilities of full and half power pulses such that she
learns most of the key and also generates a sufficiently
low QBER to go undetected. The original demonstration
[33] involved sending pulses of moderately high photon
flux (∼ 40 photons/pulse) at the end of the APD gate.
By obtaining the detection probability at full power
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FIG. 3. (a) QBER as a function of temporal separation from
the maximum single photon detection efficiency delay value.
The black line indicates the case where delayed detection is
ignored and the QBER is calculated with equation (1) and
Eve appears not to introduce a QBER greater than 11% and
thereby remains undetected. When delayed detection is taken
into account, as shown in the blue line calculated with equa-
tion (2), the QBER rises above 11% and she can be detected.;
(b) Histograms taken at minimum QBER values showing de-
tection probabilities in each Gate at 20○C. Under half-power
illumination of µ = 40 (in orange), Gate 2 is always larger
than Gate 1, which would result in a QBER value of 50% in
that Gate.; (c) as (a) but measured with the APD at –30○C.;
(d) as (b) but measured with the APD at –30○C.
and half power, it is possible to derive the resultant
QBER using the following equation from [33]:
Q = 2ph − p2h
2pf + 2(2ph − p2h) , (1)
where pf is the detection probability at full power and ph
is the detection probability at half power. Note that this
equation neglects any errors arising due to dark counts
or afterpulsing and thus only focuses on the detection
probability at the target gate. If the QBER drops below
approximately 21%, this indicates superlinearity as pf >
2ph.
We demonstrate here that GHz-gated APDs could also
show superlinear behaviour when the delayed photon de-
tections are not considered i.e. the situation when only
the target gate is considered. Here, we measured the
detection probability at full (80 photons/pulse) and half
(40 photons/pulse) power of an optical trigger pulse as a
function of the arrival time of the laser pulse on the APD
(these values were chosen due to their use in the original
demonstration in [33], however other optical powers were
also investigated, the results of which are given in the
Appendix). We do this by varying the delay on the pulse
generator providing the AC signal to the APD. The result
is given for two APD temperatures (20○C and –30○C) as
the black lines in Fig. 3(a) and (c). At a certain tempo-
ral separation from maximum detection, the QBER drops
below 11% (illustrated as the red dotted line), reaching a
minimum of approximately 7 % at around 153 ps at room
temperature, suggesting Eve could mount such an attack
at this delay and remain undetected. Either side of this
trough, the QBER equals 25 % since either pf = ph = 1
around the centre of the gate or pf = ph ≈ 0 outside of
the gate.
To probe the effect of delayed detection, we examine
the histograms in the vicinity of the superlinear regime,
i.e. corresponding to the conditions of an aftergate at-
tack, as shown in Fig. 3(b) and (d). We note that for the
cases where Eve is using the aftergate attack, a higher
proportion of clicks actually occur in the gate adjacent
to the target gate (Gate 2 as opposed to Gate 1) when
she chooses an incompatible basis to Bob, shown as the
salmon coloured bars. Delayed detection events would
have a 50% QBER as they are uncorrelated with Alice’s
qubit preparation. We note that since a higher propor-
tion of clicks occur in the adjacent gate for incompatible
bases, this would correspond to an afterpulsing probabil-
ity of over 100%, which is significantly greater than the
4% afterpulse probability measured for the single-photon
case. For compatible bases, the detection probability in
Gate 2 is approximately 15% of that in Gate 1, which
is in stark contrast to the single-photon case shown in
Fig. 2(a) where the Gate 2 is approximately 1% the size
of Gate 1.
We note that the degree of trapping is greater in the
multi-photon case than the single-photon case for two
reasons. First, more carriers are generated in the ab-
sorption region for the multi-photon case; therefore the
probability of a carrier becoming trapped at the material
interface is greater. Second, as pulses are sent at the end
of the gate, the electric field in the device is lower; there-
fore carriers that are generated and subsequently trapped
in the multiplication region have a smaller probability of
escaping the traps within the initial gating period and are
consequently more likely to be released in the following
gating period when the electric field is raised again.
This underlines the importance of incorporating de-
layed detection events into the calculation of the QBER.
To this end, we estimate the delayed detection proba-
bilities under full and half power pulses and add them
to the detection probability without delayed detection.
This leads us to the following expression for the QBER:
Q′ = 2p′h − (p′h)2
2p′f + 2[2p′h − (p′h)2] , (2)
p′f,h = pf,h + pdd, (3)
pdd = 14pdd∣f + 12pdd∣h. (4)
The quantity Q′ in Eq. (2) represents the QBER mea-
sured in the presence of the aftergate attack when de-
layed detection is taken into account. This is accounted
for with the term pdd, which represents the average prob-
ability per gate of a 1-gate-delayed detection. The factor
51/4 (1/2) in the expression is due to having a click in
Bob’s detectors when his basis matches (does not match)
Eve’s basis in the previous gate. In Eq. (4), pdd∣f (pdd∣h)
is the probability of a delayed detection in gate n when
a full-power (half-power) pulse impinged on the detector
at gate n − 1, represented as a violet-coloured (salmon-
coloured) bar in Fig. 3(b) (Fig. 3(d)).
Using this result, we plot the resulting QBER from
Eq. (2) with blue lines in Figs. 3(a) and 3(c). As it is
apparent from the figures, the 11% security threshold,
typical of the BB84 protocol, is now overcome. This re-
sult highlights the effectiveness of the delayed detection
at mitigating the faint-after gate attack.
By including contributions from delayed detection in
Eq. (2), we assume Eve mounts her attack all the time.
We therefore address the case whereby Eve only attacks
a fraction of gates. In this case, the overall QBER would
be smaller than the 11% tolerance and thus Alice and
Bob would not abort their key exchange. However, Eve’s
information would also be smaller. To draw a worst-case
scenario, we can reason as follows [17]. We assume for
simplicity that Eve attacks ”every other gate”, so that
she introduces errors in the odd gates and no errors in
the even gates. Therefore the users can notice an odd-
even pattern in the measured QBER and could draw two
different key rates, one extracted from odd gates and one
from even gates. The resulting key rate will be given by
the sum of the two partial key rates. Due to the con-
vexity dependence of the key rate on the QBER [42, 43],
the resulting key rate when Eve attacks every other gate
will always be larger than the one when she attacks every
gate, thus confirming that it would be best for Eve to at-
tack in every gate. This conclusion can be generalized to
different attacking patterns and holds under the assump-
tion that the users can recognize such patterns from a
detailed analysis of their QBER. However we also notice
that the above rationale overestimates Eve’s chances to
gain information because it assumes that the QBER is
zero for the cases where Eve does not attack, whereas
in the real case it clearly is larger than zero due to the
delayed detection effect.
We also consider the case where Eve attempts to carry
out a hybrid attack scheme, whereby she attempts to
blind counts in Gate 2 and thus suppress any erroneous
counts as a result of her after-gate attack on Gate 1.
Whilst it has been shown that blinding attacks are in-
effective against appropriately operated self-differencing
APDs [20], this places the onus on the user and such
devices are often improperly used. However, for Eve to
blind Gate 2, due to the cancellation nature of the self-
differencing circuit, she would also have to shine strong
light on Gate 1, thereby negating her original attack.
Differently to the interface trapping effect, the origin of
the delay detection is predominately due to carrier trap-
ping in the multiplication region. Consequently these de-
layed detection events feature longer lifetimes compared
to that of interface trapping events. At 20○C, the life-
times extracted from Fig. 3(b) are comparable to the
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ciency for APD 2. The increased detection probability in the
left-hand side of the figure can be explained by the dominance
of trapping in the multiplication region.
case shown in Fig. 2(b). However, at –30○C, the life-
times become much longer than those shown in Fig. 2(b)
for the same temperature, by approximately 2-3 times.
This suggests the existence of deeper traps and that these
traps, rather than the material interface, are responsible
for the delayed detection in the aftergate attack. We be-
lieve these deeper traps are located in the multiplication
region.
This is supported by measuring the detection probabil-
ity in the adjacent gate (Gate 2 in Fig. 1(b)) as a function
of separation from the maximum detection for APD 2, as
shown in Fig. 4. Reading left to right, the optical pho-
ton pulse is moving away from the end of Gate 1 and
approaching the start of Gate 2. The detection proba-
bility initially decreases as the laser approaches Gate 2.
Here, impact ionisation is occurring and therefore carriers
are multiplied and a portion of these multiplied carriers
are trapped in the multiplication region, shown in pur-
ple. The high detection probability on the left-hand side
roughly coincides with the QBER dip, underlining that
delayed detection largely arises from trapping in the mul-
tiplication layer. If the interface was the major contribu-
tor, the detection would continue to increase the closer to
Gate 2 the optical pulse is as the carriers have a progres-
sively shorter time to decay before Gate 2 is activated.
However, at a certain point the probability flattens and
then begins to increase, an observation which is consis-
tent with interface trapping, suggesting it starts to take
over once carriers cease to become trapped in deep levels
at the multiplication region.
Using the discovery of delayed detection allows us to
define the best practice for choosing a suitable gating
frequency for QKD. For this analysis at two individual
temperatures, 20○C and –50○C, we only consider trapping
at the material interface. This is the more conservative
6definition from a security point of view, as it requires
higher gating frequencies to maintain the delayed detec-
tion required for preserving the protection against the
after-gate attack. This range of gating frequencies fulfils
two criteria; (i) the gating frequency is low enough to
separate adjacent gates temporally such that a click in
the first has a small enough probability to have a delayed
detection in the second without raising the QBER above
the tolerance threshold of 11% under operation in the
absence of Eve; (ii) equally, the gating frequency is high
enough such that Eve would cause clicks in the gate ad-
jacent to her target gate with a large enough probability
to raise the QBER above the aforementioned threshold,
which we examine for a conservative attacking flux of
µ = 20 photons per pulse that is favourable for hiding
Eve’s presence (see Appendix). Our simulation result is
shown in Fig. 5, with the narrow white band indicat-
ing a regime where the APD is neither too ‘Noisy’ nor
‘Vulnerable’. Due to the longer carrier decays at lower
temperatures, we note that lower temperatures are more
favourable for slower gating whereas higher temperatures
are more suited to faster gating. Most significantly, gat-
ing frequencies of around 1 GHz, which are commonly
used for QKD experiments (e.g. [5, 31, 44]) as well as in
this study, fall in the white region, suggesting these to be
optimal values for QKD.
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FIG. 5. QBER as a function of gating frequency at 20○C and
–50○C. The central white region indicates suitable operation,
where the APD is both safe from the aftergate attack and has
sufficiently low noise to make QKD possible.
In conclusion, we have investigated two sources of trap-
ping of carriers in InGaAs APDs: at the valence-band
mismatch arising at the interface between the APD ab-
sorption and charge regions, and at deep traps in the
multiplication region. In characterising the carrier life-
time at the heterojunction, we have provided the first ex-
planation for short decays observed in fast-gated APDs.
We have determined that in the after-gate regime, how-
ever, the major contribution to delayed detection events
that can provide enhanced security arise from traps in
the multiplication region. We have provided the first ev-
idence that fast-gated APDs can be used to mitigate the
after-gate attack due to the additional contribution to
the QBER that arises from delayed detection events. By
exploiting the intrinsic imperfection of the material inter-
face, we were able to bound the appropriate APD gating
frequency suitable for use in QKD.
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APPENDIX
For the demonstration of the attack presented in the pa-
per, we chose µf = 80 and µh = 40 as the full and half
power fluxes respectively as these were values used in the
original proposal in [33]. By expanding our measurement
to examine a range of fluxes at room temperature, we
were able to obtain a more general picture of the param-
eters that Eve could use, as shown in the measurement
performed using a fast oscilloscope in Fig. 6.
The dark purple regions within the dotted line indicate
a flux and delay combination which produces a QBER
that is lower than 11 % when calculated using equa-
tion (1), within which Eve will choose to operate. The
pale yellow parts in the top left of the figure indicate a
QBER of 25 % which occurs when pf = ph = 1. This
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FIG. 6. A contour plot of the QBER calculated using Eq. (1)
as a function of the flux of the trigger pulse and APD gate
delay with respect to the laser. The region inside the dotted
line indicates where the QBER is lower than 11 % and thus
Eve can mount a successful attack in this parameter space if
delayed detections are neglected.
7overall trend of this figure implies that the closer to the
centre of the gate Eve moves, the smaller the flux she
should use to mount her attack. This suggests that this
is an extension of the original proposed after-gate attack
[45], whereby the APD is operating in linear mode and
strong pulses of power Pth overcome the discrimination
level and causes the detector to click, whereas pulses of
power Pth/2 often do not and therefore rarely cause a
click. By focusing on the edge of the gate, a smaller
flux is required to generate the same effect which is the
most favourable case for Eve. The smallest attacking flux
of µ = 20 was therefore used in determining appropriate
gating frequencies in Fig. 5.
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